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Abstract
Understanding the role that social cues have on interpersonal choice, and their susceptibility to contextual effects, is of core
importance to models of social decision-making. Language, on the other hand, is one of the main means of communication
during social interactions in our culture. The present experiments tested whether positive and negative linguistic
descriptions of alleged partners in a modified Ultimatum Game biased decisions made to the same set of offers, and whether
the contextual uncertainty of the game modulated this biasing effect. The results showed that in an uncertain context, the
same offers were accepted with higher probability when they were preceded by positive rather than by negative valenced
trait-words. Participants also accepted fair offers with higher probability than unfair offers, but this effect did not interact
with the valence of the social descriptive words. In addition, the speed of the decision was affected by valence: acceptance
choices were faster when they followed a positive adjective, whereas rejection responses were faster after a negative-
valenced word. However, these effects were highly reduced when the uncertainty was eliminated from the game. This
suggests that positive and negative relevant social information can bias decisions made to the same pieces of evidence
during interpersonal interactions, but that this mainly takes place when the uncertainty associated with the choices is high.
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Introduction
Making decisions is a common chore in our daily lives. From
small-range choices, such as where to have dinner, to long-scale
dilemmas such as whether to change jobs, we constantly find
ourselves in situations in which we have to consider the available
options and potential outcomes and their value, and choose
according to our short and/or long-term goals. The nature of our
decisions significantly influences our well-being and satisfaction,
and deficits in decision-making may have disastrous consequences
for our lives [1]. Given the extensive social nature of humans,
many of our choices involve other people.
An important line of research considers which aspects of the
current state of affairs modulate our decisions in social contexts. It is
broadly accepted that deciders are not purely rational agents who
only take into account self-interest, fixed preferences and objective
information [2,3,4]. In many cases, subjective judgements about
events are mediated by heuristics, which produce predictable biases
[5]. Other biasing factors related to the deciders include the
stereotypes they hold [6], their incidental emotional state [7,8], or
general tendencies to conform to the norms of the group [9]. In
addition, people often rely on various social cues in their
environment to guide their decisions. For example, social informa-
tion about others, such as their moral status [10], incidental feelings
[11] or displayed emotions influence decisions towards them.
Previous studies using economic games have shown that people
gather social information about strangers to guide their choices as
to whether or not to trust them. In situations in which people lack
information regarding their partners, they may use social cues with
positive or negative connotations to create a representation of the
mind of the others [12] and use this to predict their most likely
behaviour. For example, Delgado, Frank & Phelps [10] showed
that partners described as morally praiseworthy were trusted more
often than those described as having neutral or suspicious moral
traits in an iterated Trust Game. Similar results have been found
for faces displaying positive or negative emotions [13,14]. In a
related line of research, van ’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey AG & Aleman
[8] showed that implicit trustworthiness ratings of facial photo-
graphs displaying neutral emotions are highly correlated with the
amount of money that participants invest on their partners during
a Trust Game. Overall, these results suggest that people use
different types of explicit and implicit cues to evaluate their
partners in interpersonal situations and to inform their choices.
The more the social cues indicate that the partners may
reciprocate their investment, the higher the likelihood that they
will cooperate with them.
It is currently unexplored, however, how social cues are used to
evaluate situations that have already taken place. That is, given the
same objective behavior, would social cues pertaining to other
people influence how we judge their behavior, and how we react to
it? From a rational point of view, evaluations and choices (e.g.
accepting or rejecting a monetary offer in an economic game)
should not change depending on the information we have
regarding the person with whom we are interacting. On the other
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be rapidly and automatically processed [15]. Thus, choices made
in interpersonal interactions may be different depending on the
knowledge we have regarding our partner, even when the
objective situation to be judged remains the same across
conditions.
An important factor known to influence decision-making is the
uncertainty associated with a judgment [16]. In uncertain
situations, our knowledge about how actions lead to different
outcomes is not perfect [17]. The level of uncertainty may not only
change the choice strategies [18], but also the neural circuit
engaged by the decision-making process [19,20]. From a
reinforcement learning perspective, the value of information
increases with uncertainty [21]. For example, in highly-volatile
or rapidly-changing contexts, new events have a larger effect in the
decisions than in more stable contexts, in which uncertainty is
lower [18]. This tendency is observed in other domains as well.
For example, investors are more sensitive to market news and tips
during periods of unstable stock prices than during stable epochs
[22].
The role of uncertainty in social situations is not currently well
understood. Although this variable is often mentioned as an
important characteristic of many inter-personal situations [23,24],
its role in modulating the weight that different sources of social
information have in interpersonal decision-making has not been
explored. Previous research suggests that this variable may play an
important role. In his social comparison theory, Festinger [25]
proposed that in ambiguous situations in which there are no
objective means to evaluate our opinions and abilities, people use
other people as a valuable source of evidence. This line of research
has shown that uncertainty leads to a stronger identification with
social groups [26] and enhanced in-group bias [27], and may also
generate higher conformity to group norms [28]. Thus, uncer-
tainty seems to predispose people to be influenced. A different line
of research, however, suggests that social influence takes place
under several circumstances, in an ‘automatic’, even unconscious
fashion [29,30,31] and leads to expectations about how others may
act [32].
The goal of the present study was to evaluate the role of
uncertainty in the way people acquire and use social information
during interpersonal decision-making. We explored if prior social
information biases decisions to the same set of offers made in
interpersonal interactions, and whether the uncertainty of the
context modulates this effect. For this, we devised an experimental
protocol inspired by a well-known economic bargaining experi-
mental setting, the Ultimatum Game [3]. In the original game,
one player (the proposer) splits a certain amount of money into two
sums, one for him and the other for another player, the responder.
He, in turn, can either accept the offer (and thus they both win
their respective amounts) or reject it (and both get nothing).
Although a purely rational responder would accept every offer to
make money [33], results show that low or unfair offers are
rejected about half of the times [3]. In the modified game,
participants always played the role of responder to divisions of
money presented on a computer screen, which allowed measuring
their choices and their speed. To increase the sensitivity of the task
to the experimental manipulations, participants were required to
make choices within a certain time limit.
In our current society, language is one of the main means of
conveying information. It has been shown that verbally instructing
someone about the association between stimuli and events can
produce similar effects than personally experiencing or observing
such associations [34]. Thus, to mimic the information that people
may have about the personality of other people they interact with,
in our study every offer was previously preceded, on a trial-by-trial
basis, by trait-valenced adjectives (such as bright or cruel) that
described the alleged partner for each trial. As trait words are a
powerful means of social description, representing highly abstract
characterizations that are easily generalized [35], it was hypothe-
sised that the same offers would be accepted with a higher
probability when they were preceded by positive rather than by
negative descriptions of the partners. In addition, as participants
were asked to make speeded responses, the valence of the words
was expected to affect the speed of the choices in a bias-congruent
manner. Experiment 1 corroborated these hypotheses, and
Experiment 2 showed that the effects were not due to a
response-preparation bias. Experiment 3 manipulated the ambi-
guity of the context and demonstrated that the influence of social
information on choices was reduced, although not obliterated,
when the uncertainty of the game was eliminated. Finally,
Experiment 4 suggested that the social information needed to be
attributed to the partners in the game for the bias to take place.
Experiment 1
The current experiment manipulated the valence of adjectives
describing the partners in the game (positive vs. negative), the type
of offers that the partners made to the participants (fair vs. unfair)
and the time that elapsed between the adjective describing the
partner and the presentation of the offer (100 vs. 1300 ms).
Methods
Participants. Eighteen native English-speakers students from
the University of Oxford community participated in the
experiment (10 females, 20 years on average), which was
approved by the University of Oxford Research Ethics
Committee. They all signed a consent form and received course
credits and a chocolate token in exchange for their participation.
Procedure and Design. Sixty-four adjective words (4–8
letters) that could be used to describe a person were selected
from the Affective Norms English Word database (ANEW) [36].
Half of the words had a positive valence (7.6 in average, SD=0.5)
and the other half had a negative valence (2.7 in average,
SD=0.6). Both groups were equated in number of letters (6 in
average) and frequency of use (mean = 28) [37]. These words are
listed in Table 1.
Upon arrival to the lab, participants were explained that they
were going to play a modified version of the ‘Ultimatum Game’
with several different partners, represented by the computer. They
were told that the offers that they were going to receive through
the computer were made by participants in previous experiments.
To stress the plausibility of this scenario, they completed a Social
Value Orientation questionnaire [38], in which they were asked to
split fictional sums of money themselves.
During the game task, participants played the role of the
responder with several alleged partners, who were never the
same, in a modified Ultimatum Game. Their goal was to
accumulate more money than all of their partners together. If this
was accomplished, they would win the game and would receive a
chocolate token as a prize. Participants were told that their
partner for each trial had received an initial amount of fictional
British pounds (£; always an odd number) and had to split it into
two amounts, one for each of them. This offer was displayed at
the centre of the screen, in the form of two single-digit numbers
separated by a slash symbol. These two numbers (from 1 to 9)
were never the same, and the difference between them was either
£1 (‘fair offer’) or £4 (‘unfair offer’; see Table 2). The role of the
participant was to either accept or reject the offer for each trial by
Expectations Bias Uncertain Decision-Making
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their dominant hand (button assignment was counterbalanced
across participants). If the participant accepted the offer, one
amount was added to his/her account and the other was added to
the partners’ account. If the offer was rejected instead, no money
was added to any account. To speed-up responses, participants
were told that their choices had to be faster than 1500 ms;
otherwise the highest value would be added to the partners’
account. In addition, they were told that, on every trial, before
the offer they would see a trait adjective which represented
personal characteristics of their partner for that trial, gathered
from several questionnaires, and that these may or may not be
related to the offer the partners made. These trait words had a
positive valence in half of the trials, and a negative connotation in
the remaining ones. In fact, the valence of the word did not
predict the offer: both positive and negative adjectives were
followed by offers with a small (£1) or large (£4) difference
between the two numbers (50%).
Experiment 1 tested the effect of the valence of personal trait-
adjectives on choices in an uncertain context, in which participants
did not have a complete knowledge of all the information relevant
to win the game. This uncertainty was achieved by not informing
participants as to which of the two numbers in the offer
represented their share of the split; therefore they did not know
how much money they and their partner would add if they
decided to accept the offer. Participants were informed that they
were entitled to the same amount of money as all of their partners
together across the whole experiment, in the sense that half of the
times the highest value would be for them and in the other half it
would be for the partner, but they lacked this information on a
trial-by-trial basis. We manipulated the valence of the personal
adjective presented before each offer (positive or negative), the
type of offer presented (fair or unfair), and the inter-stimulus (ISI)
interval between the word and the offer (short, 100 ms, or long,
1300 ms). With this design we could explore whether the valence
of the personal information we receive regarding a person with
whom we are about to interact influences our decisions to accept
or reject offers that are objectively the same for both valence
conditions, as well as whether the fairness of the offer interacts or
not with this bias. Also, the analysis of the speed of the decisions
allowed us to investigate whether the personal information
conveyed by the verbal descriptors prepared participants to make
a decision in a valence-congruent fashion. In addition, the short
and long ISI conditions offered information regarding the
temporal course of these potential effects.
A PC running E-Prime software displayed the stimuli. Each trial
comprised the following events (see Fig 1). A fixation point (+; 0.5u)
was presented in the centre of the screen for a variable duration
(1000–2000 ms) and then changed to bold font for another
1000 ms, which noticeably enlarged its size (0.6u). Then a positive
or negative adjective (average 1.15u) was displayed in the same
position for 200 ms. After an ISI of either 100 or 1300 ms, during
which the central fixation point was presented, the offer (0.6u) was
Table 1. List of adjectives used in the task.
Word Valence Frequency Word Valence Frequency
Admired 7.74 17 Angry 2.85 45
Adorable 7.81 3 Broken 3.05 63
Brave 7.15 24 Corrupt 3.32 8
Bright 7.50 87 Crude 3.12 15
Capable 7.16 66 Cruel 1.97 15
Cozy 7.39 1 Dirty 3.08 36
Cute 7.62 5 Disloyal 1.93 2
Devoted 7.41 51 Failure 1.70 89
Elated 7.45 3 Feeble 3.26 8
Elegant 7.43 14 Foul 2.81 4
Friendly 8.43 61 Guilty 2.63 29
Gentle 7.31 27 Hatred 1.98 20
Grateful 7.37 25 Helpless 2.20 21
Happy 8.21 98 Hostile 2.73 19
Honest 7.70 47 Immoral 3.50 5
Humane 6.89 5 Insane 2.85 13
Intimate 7.61 21 Lonely 2.17 25
Jolly 7.41 4 Lost 2.82 173
Joyful 8.22 1 Moody 3.20 5
Lively 7.20 26 Nervous 3.29 24
Loved 8.64 56 Resent 3.76 8
Loyal 7.55 18 Rigid 3.66 24
Lucky 8.17 21 Rude 2.50 6
Merry 7.90 8 Scared 2.78 21
Mighty 6.54 29 Selfish 2.42 8
Nice 6.55 75 Severe 3.20 39
Proud 8.03 50 Terrible 1.93 45
Radiant 6.73 8 Troubled 2.17 31
Secure 7.57 30 Unhappy 1.57 26
Terrific 8.16 5 Upset 2.00 14
Wealthy 7.70 12 Violent 2.29 33
Wise 7.52 36 Weary 3.79 17
Avg (std)7 . 5 7 ( 0.5) 28.97 (26)2 . 7 0 ( 0.6) 27.84 (32)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015762.t001
Table 2. Offers presented during the game.
Fair Unfair
Left Right Left Right
1226
2337
3448
4559
5662
6773
7884
8951
2162
3273
4384
5495
6526
7637
8748
9815
5( 2.4)5 ( 2.4)5 ( 2.4)5 ( 2.4)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015762.t002
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feedback message was displayed during 1000 ms. If the partic-
ipants had responded within the 1500 ms window, it said
‘‘Response was on time’’. If they did not respond on time, the
message said, ‘‘The allowed response time has finished! Your
partner adds the higher amount’’. The following trial started
immediately afterwards. Across all the experiments in this study, at
the end of the task participants were informally debriefed about
the game and their impressions about it. None of them reported
suspicions regarding its rationale.
In total, participants received 256 offers, and the approximate
duration of the game was 21 minutes. Before this, participants
performed a short practice block to familiarize them with the task,
in which faces of female and male partners (50%) displaying a
neutral expression were presented instead of the trait-words.
The choices made by participants (% of accepted offers) were
analyzed by a 2 (Offer: fair vs. unfair) X 2 (Valence: positive vs.
negative) X 2 (ISI: 100 vs. 1300) multifactorial ANOVA. In
addition, we explored the speed of choices, or decision times
(DTs), in a 2 (Choice: accept vs. reject) X 2 (Offer: fair vs. unfair)
X 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (ISI: 100 vs. 1300)
multifactorial ANOVA.
Results and Discussion
Participants responded on time in 98.3% of the trials and
accepted 50% of the offers on average. The fairness of the offer
influenced participants’ choices: fair offers were accepted more
often (M=74%, SE=25%) than unfair offers (M=26%,
SE=16%), F1,17=26.80, p,0.001, g
2=.53. In addition, the
valence of the adjectives also affected choices, with offers following
positive words being accepted more times (M=57%, SE=11%)
than offers followed by negative words (M=43%, SE=15%),
F1,17=10.31, p=0.005, g
2=.04. No other factors or interactions
were significant (all ps.0.1).
There was a main effect of ISI on DTs, F1,17=9.98, p=0.01,
g
2=.11, as responses were faster in the long (M=636 ms,
SE=110) than in the short (M=684 ms, SE=112) ISI conditions.
In addition, there was a significant interaction between the choice
and the valence of the adjective F1,17=8.01, p=0.01, g
2=.06.
When participants accepted the offer, they did so faster when it
was preceded by a positive (M=620 ms, SE=93) than by a
negative (M=665 ms, SE=101) word, t(17)=22.86, p,0.05.
This effect was reversed when the offer was rejected, as responses
were faster following a negative than a positive adjective
(M=660 ms, SE=124, vs. 695 ms, SE=108), t(17)= 2.47,
p,0.05; see Figure 2.
The results of the present experiment, which used a modified
version of the Ultimatum Game, show that both the type of offers
(fair and unfair) and the valence of social information regarding
the partners (positive and negative) have an independent influence
in the decisions to the same set of offers made in an uncertain
context. The major determinant of the choices made by
participants was the fairness of the offer, as those in which the
difference between the two amounts was small were accepted
more often than those in which the difference was large. These
results agree with several previous studies that have used the classic
Ultimatum Game [3], which show that when the difference
between the two amounts in the split is large, people have a higher
tendency to reject the offer, even when this means that they will
not make any money. Research using neuroimaging techniques
has suggested that unfair offers generate negative emotions in the
responders of the game, as evidenced by activations in the right
anterior insula [39], which leads them to reject the offer.
In addition, and more importantly, our results showed that the
valence of trait descriptive adjectives can bias choices to the same set
of offers presented in an uncertain context. Participants were more
likely to accept offers preceded by words that provided positive
information about their partners than when these adjectives were
negative in valence. Note that the lack of interaction between
fairness and valence suggests that social information biased choices
made to both fair and unfair offers in the same manner. In
addition, DTs suggest that the polarity of the information provided
by the personal adjectives somehow prepared participants to either
accept or reject the offers. When the words were positive,
participants accepted the offers faster than they rejected them,
but rejection was faster when the descriptors were negative.
Interestingly, none of these effects interacted with the ISI between
the word and the offer, which suggests that the bias operates soon
after the words are presented, and it remains effective for at least a
second and a half.
As noted earlier, previous research had shown that personal
social information influences the amount of trust that participants
endow in their partners during economic games [8,10]. In these
cases, social cues are allegedly used to build a representation of the
mind of the partners, to try to predict their future behavior [12].
The results of the present experiment complement the studies
described above using a different approach. Participants played
the role of responders in the game, that is, they had to make choices
(accept or reject) regarding behaviors (the offers) that had taken place
already. Participants were informed that the adjectives may or may
not be related to the subsequent offer: in fact the offers were
exactly the same for both conditions. Along the whole experiment,
the valence of the descriptors did not predict whether the offer was
going to be fair or unfair, as these two factors were manipulated in
an orthogonal manner. Therefore, our results cannot be explained
by any type of contingency learning taking place during the
experiment, because there was no association between the valence
of the words and the offers. In spite of this, the valence of the
personal descriptors biased the choices that participants made to
the same set of offers. The influence of this factor on the DTs
suggests that participants used the words to prepare to make
decisions that were consistent with the valence of the adjectives
and this led to faster acceptance responses after positive words and
faster rejection choices after negative descriptors.
From the results of this experiment, however, it is not clear
whether words merely generated a response-related bias or
whether they primed actual decision-making tendencies. That is,
as the responses for accepting and rejecting the offers were fixed,
participants may have merely activated a motor command upon
presentation of the word. Instead of fully considering the offer,
Figure 1. Schematic display of a trial sequence in Experiments
1, 2 and 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015762.g001
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word, and prepared a motor response accordingly. Therefore, the
effect of the words on the choices may be explained by a response-
related bias or by the bias of decision-making options. Experiment
2 tested these ideas.
Experiment 2
This experiment manipulated the same variables as Experiment
1 (valence of adjectives -positive vs. negative-, the type of offers -
fair vs. unfair- and ISI -100 vs. 1300 ms-) in task slightly modified
so participants could not prepare a motor response in advance.
Methods
Participants. Eighteen native English-speakers students from
the University of Oxford community participated in the
experiment (9 females, 21 years on average), which was
approved by the University of Oxford Research Ethics
Committee. They all signed a consent form and received either
course credits or £7 in exchange for their participation, plus a
chocolate token.
Procedure and Design. The stimuli and procedure were the
same as in Experiment 1, except in the following ways. To prevent
the preparation of a motor response before the offers were
presented, the offers were displayed to the left or right (50%) of the
fixation point in an unpredictable manner. To balance visual
stimulation across hemi-fields, two hash symbols separated by a
slash were presented on the opposite side of the screen.
Participants were instructed to press the mouse button of the
side in which the two numbers were displayed on the computer
screen if they wanted to accept the offer, and the opposite button if
they wanted to reject it (see Figure 1).
Results and Discussion
Participants responded on time in 98.8% of the trials and, on
average, they accepted 47% of the offers. Similarly to Experiment
1, fair offers were accepted more often (M=64%, SE=25%) than
unfair ones (M=36%, SE=25%), F1,17=7.22, p=0.01, g
2=.2.
In addition, offers that followed positive adjectives were accepted
more often (M=57%, SE=19%) than those following negative
descriptors (M=43%, SE=20%), F1,17=4.21, p=0.05, g
2=.05.
DT were faster in the long (M=727 ms, SE=176) than in the
short ISI (M=775 ms, SE=149), F1,17=5.31, p,0.05, g
2=.08.
Also, the interaction between Choice and Valence was significant,
F1,17=7.49, p,0.05, g
2=.06. In concordance with the previous
experiment, responses accepting the offers were faster after
positive (M=710 ms, SE=119) than after negative
(M=774 ms, SE=126) words, t(17)=23.331, p,0.01, whereas
responses rejecting the offers were faster after negative (M=755,
SE=149) than positive (M=798, SE=145) trait-descriptive
adjectives, t(17)=3.027, p,0.01 (see Figure 2).
In addition, we combined the results of Experiments 1 and 2 to
test an additional hypothesis. If participants were actually
attributing the meaning of the adjectives to their partners to
guide their decisions, those words denoting characteristics closely
linked to moral and trustworthy personalities should have a larger
effect on acceptance rates than words without such associations.
To test this, we selected the trials of Experiment 1 and 2 in which
the meaning of the words had a close link to morality (positive:
friendly, honest, humane, nice vs. negative: corrupt, selfish,
disloyal, immoral), and those in which such relationship did not
hold (positive: cozy, cute, elated, jolly vs. negative: lonely, lost,
nervous, weary). First, we analyzed the acceptance rates with a 2
(Adjective content: moral vs. amoral) x 2 (Valence: positive vs.
negative) x 2 (Offer: fair vs. unfair) multifactorial ANOVA. The
interaction between the morality denoted by the adjective and its
valence was highly significant, F1,35=12.26, p=0.001. Whereas
the valence of the moral adjectives heavily influenced decisions,
F1,35=13.89, p,0.001, this variable did not have a significant
effect for amoral adjectives, F1,35=1.85, p=0.18. In addition, we
explored the effect of the adjective content in the DTs by means of
another ANOVA with the factors 2 (Adjective content: moral vs.
amoral) x 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (Choice: accept vs.
reject). Crucially, there was a third-order interaction between the
morality of the adjectives, their valence and the choice,
F1,35=4.65, p,0.05. Consistent with the previous results, the
interaction between the choices and the valence of the adjectives
when these were moral was significant, F1,35=15.38, p,0.001,
whereas this interaction did not reach significance levels for
amoral adjectives, F1,35=1.52, p=0.22. Together, these results
strongly suggest that the morality content of the words is highly
relevant both for the decision to accept or not the offers and for the
speed at which these decisions are made.
In this experiment, the unpredictability of the location of the
offer prevented participants from preparing a motor response in
advance. In spite of this, Experiment 2 replicated the results
Figure 2. Decision times (in ms) for acceptance and rejection choices preceded by positive and negative trait-descriptive words in
Experiments 1 and 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015762.g002
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accepted than unfair ones, and the same happened for offers
preceded by words with a positive valence compared with negative
ones. In the same manner as in Experiment 1, there was no
interaction between these two factors, which suggests that the role
of valence was the same for both types of offers. However, valence
had opposite effects for the two possible choices in the game, as
positive words speeded acceptance responses and negative words
made rejection decisions faster. That is, even when it is not
possible to prepare a motor response upon presentation of the
words, adjectives describing positive and negative qualities of
partners in an economic game can influence choices and affect the
speed of the responses in a decision-consistent manner. This
suggests that information regarding other people rather than
merely activating motor commands, primes decision-making
tendencies and affects their speed when we make choices in
uncertain situations. This is especially true for adjectives denoting
personality characteristics related to morality.
An open question remains regarding the scope of these effects.
The biasing effect of personal information may be restricted to
uncertain social situations, in which participants have imperfect
knowledge about the outcomes of their decisions, or it may extend
to less ambiguous contexts, in which the potential outcomes of the
different choices have been specified. In the present study, the lack
of information regarding the assignments of the splits in the offers
to the participant and the partner provides an ambiguity that may
have predisposed participants to take into account the social
information when making their decisions. Previous demonstrations
of the effects of social cues on decision making [8,13] have also
used uncertain contexts, as participants had to play with unknown
partners and did not have information regarding their behavior in
previous interactions, except the social cues provided by the
experimenters [40]. It may be that the uncertainty of the situation
makes social cues valuable as the only available means to predict
the behavior of the partner, and this is why they bias decisions.
Another possibility is that social information is highly salient in any
dynamic interaction between people and thus it may affect choices
even in unambiguous contexts. The following experiment
intended to contrast these two options by including a block of
trials with high uncertainty (as in the previous experiments) and
another block with low uncertainty. To reduce uncertainty, the
two numbers in the offer were colored with different hues, and
participants were informed which of the two colors would always
add to their account in case they accepted the offer. Thus, in the
certain block participants had a complete account of the
consequences of their choices, which reduced the ambiguity
present in the previous experiments.
Experiment 3
This experiment manipulated the same variables as Experiment
1 and 2 (valence of adjectives -positive vs. negative-, type of offers -
fair vs. unfair- and ISI -100 vs. 1300 ms-) and added the variable
of contextual uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain block). In the
uncertain block, the offers were presented in black (as in the
previous experiments) and thus the uncertainty of the game was
high. In the certain block, the two numbers in the offers were
colored in different hues. This informed participants about the
specific amount that they would add if they accepted the offer and
thus reduced the uncertainty associated to the game.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-six native Spanish-speakers students
from the University of Granada participated in the experiment (22
females, 20 years on average), which was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Experimental Psychology of the
University of Granada (Spain). They all signed a consent form and
received course credits in exchange for their participation.
Procedure and Design. As Experiment 3 was conducted in
Granada (Spain), we made a new list composed of Spanish words.
Stimuli were 64 adjectives from the Spanish translation of the
ANEW database [41]. They were matched to the stimuli in the
previous list in terms of number of letters, frequency, valence and
arousal ratings (all the Fs comparing the two lists were ,1).
Experiment 3 had two blocks (its order was counterbalanced
across participants), which differed in the level of uncertainty of
the game. In the uncertain block, the procedure was the same as in
the previous experiments. The certain block differed in the color of
the numbers that comprised the offer. One of them was red and
the other one was green. The color assignment was balanced with
respect to the magnitude of the numbers (i.e. the higher number
was green in half of the trials) and their relative location in the
offer (i.e. the number presented to the left was green in half of the
trials). The uncertainty of the game in this block was reduced
because the experimenter informed participants which of the two
numbers would be added to their account if they accepted the
offer. Half of the participants were assigned the amount coded in
green, and the other half received the amount colored in red. To
maintain the duration of the game comparable to the previous
experiments, participants received the same number of offers
(256).
The choices made by participants (% of accepted offers) were
analyzed by a 2 (Block: certain vs. uncertain) X 2 (Offer: fair vs.
unfair) X 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) multifactorial ANOVA.
In contrast to the previous experiments, we did not analyze the
speed of the decisions. The introduction of a new variable reduced
in half the number of trials per condition, which resulted in
decreased power. This made the analysis of the DTs unreliable.
These data, however, were not relevant for the hypothesis tested in
Experiment 3. The practice block was the same as in the previous
experiments.
Results and Discussion
Participants responded on time in 98.2% of the trials. During
the block with high certainty, they accepted 90% of the beneficial
offers and only 10% of the non-beneficial type (all the participants
‘‘won’’ the game).
The certainty of the block had an effect on decisions:
participants accepted more offers in the certain (M=53.5%,
SE=10%) than in the uncertain (M=49.7%, SE=27%) context,
F1,25=4.38, p,0.05, g
2=.01. The type of offer (fair or unfair)
affected the decisions as well. Participants accepted more fair
(M=62.5%, SE=17%) than unfair (M=40,5%, SE=17%)
offers, F1,25=29,38, p,0.001, g
2=.24. The valence of the
adjectives had an impact on the responses. Offers preceded by a
positive adjective (M=56.7%, SE=13%) were more likely to be
accepted than those preceded by a negative adjective (M=46,3%,
SE=13%), F1,25=12,87, p,0.01, g
2=.05. In addition, there was
an interaction between the type of the offer and the certainty of the
context, F1,25=24,03, p,0.001, g
2=.1. The effect of the offer
(i.e. fair minus unfair offer acceptance) was larger in the uncertain
(36,7%; t(25)=5.47, p,0.001) than in the certain condition (7,4%;
t(25)=2.87, p,0.01). Also, whereas fair offers were accepted more
often in the uncertain than in the certain context (67.8% vs.
57.2%, t(25)=3.1, p,0.01), unfair offers were accepted less often
in the uncertain than in the certain context (31.1% vs. 49.8%,
t(25)= 24.8, p,0.001). Finally, there was an interaction between
the certainty of the context and the valence of the words,
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2=.02. In the uncertain condition, the
effect of the valence (i.e. the acceptance rate after positive words
minus the acceptance rate after negative words) of adjectives was
higher (16,7%; t(25)=3.25, p,0.01) than in the certain condition
(4,4%; t(25)=2.03, p=0.05); see Figure 3.
In this experiment, the inclusion of a block with colored
numbers as valid cues that reliably informed participants about the
best choice to win the game (i.e. accept offers in which the higher
number would be added to their account and reject those in which
the partner would receive the higher amount) changed the pattern
of results with respect to the previous experiments. Although the
influence of fairness and social information in the choices was not
completely obliterated in the block with low uncertainty, their
effect was reduced compared to the high uncertainty context.
The fairness of the offers influenced decision-making once
again: fair offers were accepted more often than unfair offers. Also,
the type of offer interacted with the block: the effect of the fairness
of the offer was larger in the uncertain than in the certain block.
Intriguingly, whereas fair offers were accepted more often in the
uncertain than in the certain context, this pattern was reversed for
unfair offers, which were accepted less often in the uncertain than
in the certain block. These differences may stem from the use of
different strategies in the two contexts. Whereas the lack of
information in the uncertain context may have led participants to
rely heavily on the type of offer, the weight of this factor may have
been toned down in the certain context given the availability of
additional and game-relevant cues. Thus, the increase and
decrease of acceptance rates driven by positive and negative
words in the uncertain context may have been brought closer to
mean acceptance rates (i.e. 50%) in the certain block, which could
explain the differences. Note, however, that these results were not
predicted and may need additional studies to be fully explained.
In addition, the valence of the adjectives had an effect on the
acceptance rates, which also interacted with the type of block, as
the effect of this variable was larger in the uncertain than in the
certain block. Therefore, it seems that when the uncertainty of the
situation is reduced, the fairness of the offer and also the social
information provided by personal adjectives have a much smaller
weight into the decision of accepting or rejecting the offers.
It is not clear, however, to what extent the attribution of
personality characteristics to the partners was the crucial factor
biasing the decisions. It could be argued that given that the nature
of the task is rather artificial, in the uncertain block participants
relied on the valence of the words because they had nothing else to
go on. At the same time, the positive or negative valence of the
words might have just caused emotional priming in the participants
that biased them to accept offers related to positive words and to
reject offers associated to negative words [7,23]. To test this
alternative explanation, we performed a final study. In Experiment
4, participants were told that the computer presented the words at
random.
Experiment 4
This experiment reproduced the variables manipulated in
Experiment 3 (valence of the words, type of offer and uncertainty
of the blocks), with the only variation being the instructions given
to participants.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-six native Spanish-speakers students
from the University of Granada participated in the experiment (21
females, 21 years on average), which was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Experimental Psychology of the
University of Granada (Spain). They all signed a consent form and
received course credits in exchange for their participation. Data
from one participant was lost due to computer failure.
Procedure and Design. Apparatus and Stimuli were the
same as in Experiment 3. Participants were told that before every
offer, the computer would present a word at random that was
unrelated to the task or to their partners. All the other details of the
procedure were identical to the previous experiment.
Results and Discussion
Participants responded on time in 97.6% of the trials. During
the block with high certainty, they accepted 91% of the beneficial
offers and only 18% of the non-beneficial type (as in the previous
experiments, all the participants ‘‘won’’ the game).
The ANOVA showed a main effect of the type of offer, as fair
offers (M=68.7%, SE=14.1%) were accepted more frequently
than unfair offers (M=39%, SE=11.4%), F1,24=44.16, p,0.001,
g
2=.37. In addition, there was an interaction between the
certainty of the block and the type of offer, F1,24=40.87, p,0.001,
g
2=.18, as the effect of the type of offer was larger in the
uncertain (51%, t(24)=7, p,0.001) than in the certain (9%,
t(24)=2.86, p,0.01) block. As predicted, however, the valence of
the nouns did not have any effect or interacted with any other
factor (all Fs,2.71, all ps.0.11).
Experiment 4 showed that when the words preceding the offers
were not attributed to personality characteristics of the partners,
Figure 3. Acceptance rates for fair and unfair offers following positive and negative adjectives in uncertain and certain contexts in
Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015762.g003
Expectations Bias Uncertain Decision-Making
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e15762they did not have any influence on participant’s acceptance rates.
As the adjectives used were the same as in previous experiments,
this result suggests that the biasing effect that personality adjectives
had on previous studies was not due to a mere emotional arousal
generated by the words. It also suggests that in the uncertain
context, participants did not use any kind of information available
to guide their decisions, as if this were the case we would have
observed a biasing effect also after irrelevant nouns.
Discussion
The present study tested the idea that the personal information
we have regarding other people with whom we interact may
prepare us to take a line of action that is consistent with the
valence of such prior social information, and bias the decisions we
make in response to the same set of behaviors. Our results
supported this conclusion, and further showed that this influence
on decision-making is mainly present in uncertain contexts, in
which participants lack precise information regarding the con-
sequences of their choices.
Linguistic information is a powerful means to convey social
information in our culture. When we lack first-person experience
regarding a situation or another person, we often turn to informa-
tion provided by others to form an opinion [25]. The present study
showed that non-predictive personal information conveyed in the
form of written verbal labels bias the choices we make to a set of
offers that are objectively the same. Note that none of the
experiments included any reliable association between the valence
of the words and the nature of the offers. This allowed us to study
the spontaneous bias that attributing personality characteristics to
other people has on decision-making aside from experimental
associations (e.g. between positive words and fair offers) that could
have made such biasing an optimal decision strategy for
participants.
Thus, it seems that the semantic content of the words ‘auto-
matically’ prepared participants to make choices consistent with
their valence, and thus acceptance choices were speeded after
positive adjectives whereas rejection decisions were faster after
negative-valenced words. The data, however, do not suggest that
positive and negative words primed participants to expect fair or
unfair offers, because we never observed an interaction between
the valence of the words and the type of offer. The semantic
information provided by the words may have focused the attention
of participants in positive or negative personal characteristics of
their partners, and this preparation may in turn have prepared
them to accept the offers presented after positive words and to
reject those appearing after negative personal information. This
could then explain the speeding of the choices found for responses
that were consistent with this attentional preparation. In addition,
these effects took place with short and long intervals between the
words and offers, which suggests that the biasing effect of social
cues comes into operation soon after the information is presented,
and remains active for at least a second and a half.
Further research would be needed to evaluate the level of
processing at which this biasing effect takes place. Results from
Experiment 2 ruled out a motor-preparation description, as results
remained unchanged even when participants could not prepare a
motor command upon presentation of the adjectives. One option
is that the same offers were perceived or evaluated as more fair when
they were preceded by words that described positive characteristics
of the partner, compared to negative descriptions. More positive
evaluations would lead to a higher acceptance rate, and this would
be reflected in the results we obtained. Another possibility is that
although offers were perceived in the same manner in both
conditions, the adjectives biased the decision-making process, by
priming acceptance responses after positive descriptors and
rejection after negative ones. Future experiments employing
neuroimaging techniques, which could offer information about
the brain areas involved and/or the temporal profile of the effects,
may shed some light on this respect.
The results of Experiment 3 suggested that the effect of the
valenced-words on choices is not obligatory, but rather modulated
by the uncertainty of the context in which decisions take place.
From a reinforcement learning computational perspective, it has
been proposed that contextual uncertainty arbitrates between the
use of two dissociable brain control systems. The dorsal striatum
would be involved in responses made in habitual, well-learned
situations, in which uncertainty is low, whereas the prefrontal
cortex would become engaged in contexts of high uncertainty
[19,20]. In these situations, agents seem to be more receptive to
new information, which becomes more valuable and is given a
larger weight in the decision-making process [16,18]. The results
of the present study fit nicely into this general framework by
showing that uncertainty also modulates the influence of prior
social information in interpersonal decision-making. The nature of
the information, in addition, is also relevant in the sense that not
all the information available is used to guide choices. As the results
of Experiments 2 and 4 suggest, the pertinence of the information
to the decision (i.e. the attribution of the information provided by
the words to the partners in the game) modulated the extent of its
influence. Moral-related adjectives had a large effect, whereas
nouns presented at random had no effect whatsoever.
The reduced effect of personal adjectives on choices during the
certain block in Experiment 3 need not to be in conflict with the
large body of social cognition literature that shows that our
behavior is in many occasions influenced by priming from social
information even when we lack conscious awareness of the primes
[29], nor with the line of research showing that words are may be
processed in an ‘automatic’ fashion, regardless of task demands
[42]. Taking the results of the first three experiments together, it
could well be the case that the semantic information provided by
the words was processed regardless of the context and the level of
uncertainty may have modulated the weight that this social
information received in the evaluation and/or choice process.
In contrast to the valence of the social information, the fairness
of the offer had an effect in the choices made by participants along
the four experiments. Several lines of research have shown that
humans are not purely rational agents, but take into account how
the outcomes of behaviors affect others and have concerns for
norms of fairness [3]. The preference for fairness has been
established in many different cultures, although it seems to be
absent in our closest living relatives, chimpanzees [43]. In the
current modified version of the Ultimatum Game, the fairness of
the offer did not have a direct effect on how much money the
participant would win, but on how much they would accumulate
in order to win the game eventually. In spite of this, participants
did take the fairness of the offer into account when making their
decisions, and they accepted more fair than unfair offers.
The fairness of the offer, however, did not interact with the
valence of the adjective across our experiments. Previous studies
[7,8] have shown that inducing emotional states in participants
during the Ultimatum Game influences specifically choices made
to unfair offers, in the sense that negative moods enhance rejection
rates for unfair offers. This suggests that such rejection is mediated
by a negative emotional reaction, which is also supported by
neuroimaging evidence [39]. Positive and negative personal
information in our game, on the other hand, modulated both
fair and unfair offers to the same extent, which suggests that these
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manner. Further studies which manipulate both the emotion of the
participants and the information about their partners in the game
would be needed to clarify the relation between these two sources
of bias in interpersonal decision-making.
The ecological validity of our experiments is limited. Partici-
pants were not engaged in real, live two-person interactions and
they did not have any previous experiences with the alleged people
they were playing with. But these features, in turn, provided
additional experimental control that helped to prove the basic
phenomena of interest (as observed in both percentage of
acceptance rates and speed of responses). Future research should
be aimed at using procedures more ecologically valid that could be
used to generalize the effects observed in the current study to more
natural contexts.
In summary, our results show that the attribution of trait-
descriptive words to the partners in a modified Ultimatum Game
biases the decisions made to the same set of objective offers. In
Experiments 1 and 2, the speed of these decisions was also
modulated in a bias-congruent fashion. These effects were
reduced, although not eliminated, when the uncertainty of the
game was lowered. Overall, these results extend previous studies
using economic games by showing that judgments we make about
the same behavior may be influenced by the knowledge we have
about the personal characteristics of others.
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